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OIL IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NIGERIA
INTRODUCTION
The oil industry is perhaps one of the most important and
largest industries in the world. Through its wide areas of
operation, nature of product demand and international network
of operating companies, the industry affects every country in
today's civilised world. As a result, a day hardly passes without
oil being in the news. The industry has bestowed great financial
power on oil producers some of which belong to the third world.
This new found financial power has posed a challenge to the
ability of third world oil producers to evolve and execute
development strategies designed to accelerate the pace of their
economic development. An important factor of this new found
financial power is the formation of the Organisation of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960. Nigeria
became one of its members in 1971. OPEC provided a welcome
opportunity for third world countries constituting its
membership to learn to co-operate in defence of their
production and pricing strategies. Following the sharp and rapid
upward adjustment in oil prices in 1973/74 and since then,
OPEC members acquired a new voice and bargaining power in
the comity of nations. An assessment of these developments
provides a good insight into the way in which oil exerts its
tremendous influence on the economy of major oil producers,
with particular reference to Nigeria. This paper is divided into
five sections. Section I deals with the growth and development of
the oil industry in Nigeria. Activities of the participating
international oil companies and the intervention of the Nigerian
government in oil industry are in Section II. Section III analyses
the pricing policy i.e. the role of OPEC in Nigeria's oil pricing as
well as the influence of the major oil consumers. Section IV
deals with the role of oil in the development of the Nigerian
economy, while Section V concludes the study.

Section I
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE OIL
INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA
The development of the petroleum industry in Nigeria dates
back to 1937 when the country was under the British rule. In that
year, the colonial government considered granting exploratory
rights to Shell D' Arey company- a consortium owned by Royal
Dutch Shell and British Petroleum Company.
This consortium later became Shell BP Petroleum
Development Company of Nigeria (Shell-BP). The emerging
exploratory license which covered the entire area of Nigeria was
granted to the company in 1938. 1 The incidence of World War II
necessitated the suspension of prospecting activities which were
not resumed until 1946. Following geological and geophysical
tests, Shell-BP in 1957 reduced its concession area from
925,380.0 square kilometres to only 103,648 square kilometres,
in the Niger Delta which indicated the greatest promise for
crude oil finds. It was from this area, (Oloibiri, Rivers State) that
Shell-BP exported its first crude in 1958 and thereby launched
Nigeria into the community of crude oil producers and
exporters. The Shell-BP was forced by law to surrender to the
Nigerian Government in 1957 other areas of oil exploration.
These were picked up by other companies notably Mobil which
by 1955 had been licensed to explore for petroleum over the
entire Northern Region and most of the Western Region.
Several other companies mostly foreign transnational

corporations thereafter sought and obtained licences to search
for and exploit Nigerian crude petroleum, first on-shore and
from 1961 off-shore as well. Currently, foreign companies
producing oil in Nigeria include Shell, Gulf, Mobil, AGIP,
Phillips, ELF, Tennenco, Ashland and Sunray. 2
Indigenous private companies also participate in the
development of the oil industry in Nigeria. For example, Henry
Stephen's and Sons Limited started exploratory activities on
12th February, 1972. After five odd years of intensive activities,
it folded up at the expiration of its concession on 11th February,
1977 without discovering any oil deposits. Addo Ibrahim's
NIGUS, the only indigenous company currently in the oil
industry, commenced exploratory activities in 1979. It is still
searching. Other private individuals in the oil industry are
engaged in the distributive sector or are liaising between buyers
and sellers in the crude oil market for a commission.
Public sector participation in the industry was initially limited
mainly to granting exploratory licenses to prospective oil
companies as well as regulating company activities. As
government gained more insight into the operations of this
strategic industry and in line with its desire to control the
"commanding heights" of the Nigerian economy and in order to
obtain the maximum benefits from the industry to accelerate its
pace of economic development designed to raise the general
standards of living of the Nigerian population, specialist
agencies were set up. The characteristics and functions of these
agencies have varied or grown over time. In the main, they are
charged with the responsibility not only of monitoring the
activities of the oil companies but also of taking charge of
implementing government equity participation interests in the
industry as well as other agreements. Further they are to enter
into joint venture operations with the oil companies, prospect,
explore for oil and to engage in both upstream and downstream
activities, i.e. all the ramifications of the oil industry.

Production and Exports
In the period 1958-1966, there was a continuous increase in
crude oil production. From barely 1.876 million barrels in 1958
or an average daily production of 5,000 barrels, the level of
annuai production rose to 152,428 mb or to an average daily
output of about 418,000 barrels in 1966 (see Table I). The
reduced levels of production in 1967 and 1968 was the result of
the outbreak of civil war which disrupted the activities of the
companies located in the war affected areas. Since the end of the
civil war in 1970 however, there was a steady increase between
1969 and 1974. Production levels rose continuously from
197 .204 million barrels in 1969 to 823.318 million barrels or 2.3
mbd in 1974. As against this, production levels since 1975 have
fluctuated. Having declined to 651.507 mb, or 1.8 mbd in 1975,
production rose through 1976 to 776.054 mb in 1977. It
plummeted to 667 .609 mb in 1978 and then rose to 842.474 mb
benchmark or 2.308 mbd the highest level ever. From there
production nose-dived through 1980 to 522.102 mb or 1.4 mbd in
1981 - the lowest levei in ten years. The fluctuating levels of
production since 1975 can be traced among other factors to
economic depression in the major oil importing countries in
1975, 1978 and since the third quarter of 1981 as well as the
exploitation of North Sea, Alaskan and Mexican crude which
because they have a high percentage of light components as the
Nigerian crude are therefore its direct competitors.
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doubled, attaining about 6 million tonnes in 1980 and about 7
million tonnes in 1981 (see Table below).

Crude oil produced in Nigeria used to be exported in full. This
situation has changed remarkably since the ccmmissioning of
the country's three refineries - attesting to economic
development efforts of the government. The first refinery,
opened in 1965 at Alasa Eleme (near Port-Harcourt) was built at
a cost of tt21.0 million by the Nigeria Petroleum Refining
Company (N.P.R.C.) as a joint venture between the Nigerian
governments and two multinational oil companies, the British
Petroleum and the Royal Dutch Shell. The Federal government
now owns it completely having paid up the other shareholders.
The refinery's initial installed capacity of 31,000 bd was
expanded to 55,000 bd following repairs to civil war damage
which put the plant out of action. Its installed capacity was
finally raised to 60,000 bd in 1978. The other two refineries also
owned by the Federal Government are located at Warri and
Kaduna, respectively. Completed in June 1978, the Warri
refinery went into operation in September of that year with a
daily installed capacity of 100,000 bd. The refinery at Kaduna
was commissioned on 25th October 1980 with identical capacity
as the Warri Refinery. Its special advantage lies in its ability to
handle the processing of heavier crudes. Together the three
refineries provide the country with an installed refining capacity
of 260,000 bd.
Crude oil deliveries to the local refineries have grown
ph~nomenally since the war (see Table below). From 7.611 mb
or a monthly average of 0.634 mb in 1970, the level of deliveries
rose continuously to 20.985 mb or 1.749 mb monthly in 1973.
Thereafter, it fluctuated downwards through 1974 to 17.667 mb
in 1975 owning to a major breakdown which resulted in a
temporary closure of the plant. After repairs, deliveries peaked
up reaching 21.320 mb benchmark in 1976. From there the level
declined to 19.988 mb when the plant was again shut down
temporarily for repairs.

Nigeria's Consumption of Petroleum Products (1972-1981)
(tonnes)

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981

7.611
14.510
16.431
20.985
18.864
17.667
21.320
19.888
24.868
32.667
50.852
58.542

Proportion of
Total Production
%

0.634
1.209
1.369
1.749
1.715
1.473
1.777
1.657
2.072
2.722
4.238
4.8796

1.9
2.6
2.6
2.8
2.3
2.7
2.8
2.6
3.7
3.9
6.8
11.2

Quantity
of
Locally Imports
Refined Dependproducts
ence
consumed Ratio

1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981 1

1,898,657
2,330,012
2,637,824
3,136,909
3,398,385
4,835,519
6,172,223
6,474,614
7,551,533
8,588,568

482,279
2,024,508
2,439,425
1,927,710
2,094,853
1,770,023
2,464,553
4,808,755
4,970,022
7,183,985

1,088,837
2,692,597
2,632,890
2,204,150
2,721,981
2,504,642
2,646,707
5,035,906
5,927,323
7,253,016

660,560
668,089
193,465
276,440
627,128
734,619
182,154
227,151
957,301
69,031

74.6
13.1
7.5
38.5
38.4
63.4
60.1
25.7
34.2
16.3

1

Provisional
Source: NNPC Monthly Petroleum Information (1973-1981)
Notes: Domestic consumption refers to quantity of locally
refined products consumed plus imports.
In the period, total consumptfon of petroleum products
attained unprecedented levels. At 2.3 million tonnes in 1973, it
more than doubled to 4.8 million tonnes 1977. From there it rose
by 1.7 times to 8.6 million tonnes in 1981.
Products of the refineries have curtailed Nigeria's dependence
on imported petroleum products such as cooking gas, aviation
oil, kerosene, petrol of varying qualities, etc. The refineries
have thus reduced Nigeria's import dependence ratio from an
annual average of 41.1 per cent between 1972 and 1977 to 39.4
per cent in 1978-1980 and to 16.3 per cent in 1981. In absolute
terms, importation of petroleum products which averaged 1.25
million tonnes between 1972 and 1977 rose to 2.65 million
tonnes in 1978-1980 and declined to 1.4 million tonnes in 1981
under the combined effects of the three refineries.

Crude Oil Deliveries to the Nigeria's Local Refineries
Monthly
Average

Period

Total
domestic
Consump- Locally
tion of
petroleum Refined
products products Exports

Exports
From a low level of 1.820 mb in 1958, crude oil exports rose
persistently to 139.550 mb in 1966. It declined through 1967 to
52.130 mb in 1968. After disruption caused by the civil war, the
volume of exports rose to a peak of 795.710 million barrels in
1974 and thereafter fluctuated in a generally downward
direction with the exception of 1979 when it established its
highest ever peak of 812. 727 mb. In value terms, oil exports rose
persistently from tit 1.8 million in 1958 to tit 184.0 million in 1966
but dropped sharply to tt77 .6 million in 1968 as a result of the
civil war. From 1969 crude oil exports again maintained a
continuous upward movement rising from tt301.2 million to a
peak of MS,366 million in 1974. Since then on, the pattern of
movement has been characterised by sharp fluctuations. It
fluctuated between a trough oftt4,565 million in 1975 and the
highest ever peak of N 13,523 million in 1980. The pattern of
fluctuations in oil exports follow that which was observed in
production levels and are explained by the same factors.

Source: Lagos Chambers of Commerce and Industry

Deliveries attained unprecedented levels since 1978, rising from
24.868 mb during the year through 1979 to 50.852 mb or 4.238
mb monthly in 1980 and to 58.542 mb or 4.879 mb monthly in
1981. The rise in the level of deliveries was due mainly to the two
new refineries at Warri and Kaduna which started operations
during the period.
Against the background of projected local demand, refining
activities have grown enormously since the war. Refined
products at about 3 million tonnes between 1973 and 1978
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in 1972 and 1973, respectively. 9
The basic objective of TNC is to maximise profits from their
global operations. Thus they should not therefore be viewed as
coming into Nigeria with the objective of fostering her
development. If the influences at the power base of governments
are not in collusion with the oil companies, it is almost inevitable
that conflicts will arise between the host governments and the
TNC subsidiaries. Because of the subservience of these
subsidiaries to their parent companies, their operations may
give rise to a structure of inputs, outputs, cost, prices and profits
that may be inconsistent with either the needs of the host
country or the desires of its government.
TNC normally prefers 100 per cent ownership of its subsidiary ·
especially when new technologies and/or products are being
exported. However, new form of ownership are constantly
appearing. Joint ventures (with either LDC governments or
private capital), minority participation, management contracts,
etc. This process has been assisted by increased intensity of
economic nationalism in LDCs.
Although the development of their host countries is not the
preoccupation of the TNCs, they nevertheless can make
considerable contribution to the development processes of these
countries. The main contributions include the access they
provide to modern technology, foreign markets and to scarce
managerial as well as technical skills. Given the low level of
organisational and technical skills in Nigeria as in many LDCs,
these may indeed be indispensable elements in the country's
development process. In many cases (in the Western World)
only TNCs have the financial resources and know-how to
develop new and better products which may be essential for
agricultural development (for example, pesticides); exploit
mineral resources and undertake large-scale construction
projects. It is therefore of paramount importance to seek to
maximise the benefits from these factors in governmentnegotiated agreements with the multinational oil corporations.

In general, there has been an impressive performance which
must be related not so much to growth in volume but to record
increases in crude oil prices. As a proportion of total exports,
crude oil was only 0.7 per cent in 1958. From there it rose
continuously to 33.1 per cent in 1966. Since 1970, the share of oil
exports has risen significantly reaching a record level of 98 per
cent in 1980 (see Table 2).

Section II
ACTIVITIESOFTHEPARTICIPATINGAGENTS
This section is devoted to the analysis of the characteristics,
motivation and activities of the transnational corporations in the
Nigerian oil industry on the one hand and those of the Nigerian
government on the other. The analysis starts with the
companies.

The Oil Companies
Some economists see the presence of transnational
corporations (TNCs) in the third world countries as vital for the
rapid growth and development of the latter's economies. There
are, of course, those who see the TNCs as the most important
aspect of the imperialist penetration of the LDCs, heightening
their dependency and deepening the process of dependent
development. 3
One of the major features of the TNC is the pre-dominance of
large sized firms. It is not only its size and scope of operations
that is important but also its structure, organisation and its view
of the world economy and its role in the development of that
economy. 4 TNCs are often stronger financially than most host
countries in which they operate. For example, the value added
by each of the top ten TNCs in 1971 was greater than $3 billion
which is more than the GNP of over 80 UN member countries.
The value added of all TNCs was estimated at $500 billion in
1971, which was approximately 20 per cent of world GNP
(excluding the centrally planned economies). 5 Estimates vary as
to the size of stock of foreign direct investment in LDCs. Reuber
(1973) estimated the book value of private foreign investment to
be approximately $40 billion at the end of 1970. 6 The United
Nations estimated the total stock of direct foreign investment to
be $165 billion of which approximately $52 billion was located in
LDCs. 7 According to Reuber's estimate, investment in
petroleum amounted to $13.0 billion or 33.3 per cent of the total
investment in LDCs.
Another striking characteristic of TNCs is the
overwhelmingly oligopolistic nature of the industries in which
they operate. Their mode of operations, characterized by
technological
innovation,
product
innovation
and
differentiation, heavy advertising and brand identification
reflect and reinforce their oligopolistic structure. The activities
of the seven major TNCs in the oil industry exhibit conspicuous
backward and forward integration, encompassing exploration,
production, transportation, refining and marketing of
petroleum products. In 1966, Exxon, one of the major
companies had 35 per cent of its refining operations in Latin
America, 28 per cent in USA and Canada and 37 per cent in
Europe and Africa. 8 In 1972, the oil major companies together
controlled 72 per cent of the total world crude oil production.
Although, Adejugbe (1976) feels that the concentration ratio of
the majors may decline owing to the operations o,f expanding
national oil companies of the OPEC member countries, he
showed that whereas in 1964 the seven majors controlled 63 per
cent of crude oil production, they controlled 72 and 70 per cent

The Nigerian Government Intervention in the oil Industry
What are the government's objectives in its dealing with the
oil companies? What guidelines and institutions have been
established for achieving those objectives and what are the
results? These questions call for very carefully considered
answers.
The overall ultimate objective of the Nigerian Government's
involvement in the oil industry is the progressive attainment of
maximum degree of management, control and direction of its
hydrocarbon resources. Long-term as well as short-term
objectives can be identified. The pursuit of these objectives has
been illuminated up to the late 1970's by 0. Lolomari. 10 P.C.
Asiodu's comments on Lolomari's work, indicated short-term
objectives of government at different stages of involvement or
participation. 11 The attempt here is to outline a theoretical
framework for analysing government oil policies and then apply
it for a critical assessment of the policies.

Stages of Development in Oil Policy
A model underlying the policy pursued by important oil
producing third world countries appears to lend itself to five
stages of development. 12 The first stage is characterised by offer
of maximum incentives to oil exploring companies by the host
country. The purpose is to attract the companies that have
capital and know-how which the host country does not possess.
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professionally more familiar with solid minerals than with
petroleum was put in charge of the administration of the young
industry. He was assisted by a retired BP staff recruited by the
colonial government to set up the hydrocarbon section of the
Ministry of Mines and Power. This one-man section had the
responsibility of co-ordinating all the activities of the oil
industry.
The second stage of Nigeria's participation in the oil industry
was heralded by the Petroleum Decree of 1969 which also set
new horizons for official policy objectives. The Decree reduced
the period of concessions from 30 to 20 years and more explicitly
regulated periods and obligations for training and indigenisation
of staff, etc. In 1971 a series of negotiations culminated in drastic
reductions in annual capital and depreciation allowances and
government declaration of its ownership of gas resources. In
1971 and 1972 when activities extended to the off-shore areas,
the government in its desire to limit the activities of the oil
majors in Nigeria made the offer to oil minors. These oil minors
included Occidental, Deminex and Japan Petroleum. Their
terms were more beneficial to government in the sense that they
agreed to explore for oil at their own risk, until commercial
production was established before government could come in as
a partner and be obliged to pay its share of prediscovery
expenses. Following high expectations from these off-shore
areas at the time, government obtained terms beyond the usual
clauses. For example, the companies agreed to offer stated
number of scholarships to Nigerians annually and to finance
exchange of university lecturers in petroleum related subjects.
In 1973, the first Product-sharing contract was concluded with
Ashland Oil company. Ashland was to look for and produce oil
at its own expense. Thereafter government would take a certain
proportion of the production leaving the balance for Ashland to
recoup its costs with a margin of profits. This modality was first
operated in Indonesia.
As regards the institutional setting, the one-man section in the
then Ministry of Lagos Affairs, Mines and Power was upgraded
to a Department and finally to a full-fledged Ministry of
Petroleum Resources in 1975. The Ministry was charged with
the responsibility for formulating the policies to guide the
operations of the industry. In furtherance of the aims and
objectives in respect of control and participation in the oil
industry, the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) was
established in 1971. The Corporation did not, however, take off
until 1973.
Foundations of the third stage in the evolutionary process of
Nigerian's involvement in the oil industry began when NNOC
started operations. 16 By 1974 NNOC had carried out some
seismic work off-shore, using specialist contractors and had also
started drilling. The NNOC was charged with the
responsibilities to explore, prospect, win, produce, transport,
store and market crude petroleum and its refined products. The
corporation took over all the unallocated and relinquished
concessions and awarded new concessions only on partnership
basis, with the government having 51 per cent interest.
Following OPEC decisions, NNOC acquired participation
interests in all the operating oil companies. By 1974, NNOC had
acquired 55 per cent in Shell-BP, Gulf and Mobil and had
brought participation in all producing concessionaires in the
country to this level.
However, NNOC could not justify the high expectations
placed on it. This was partly due to institutional, structural
inadequacies and partly to a lack of executive capacity. When
NNOC started operations in 1973, government's oil policy was

After the initial discovery of oil in commercial quantities and its
production establishes the country as a proven oil producer, the
second stage sets in.
During the second stage, the generous incentives earlier given
for exploration are gradually and progressively modified and
replaced by new exploration agreements. Simultaneously the
country increasingly gains insight into the nature and operations
of the oil industry. Given increased understanding, the
traditional concession agreements are replaced by risk-bearing
and production-sharing contracts. The foreign oil company
bears the initial risk of exploration and it is only when oil is
discovered in commercially viable quantities that the host
country begins to share in production costs.
The third stage is predicated upon the attainment of adequate
know-how in exploration and production, access to sources of
equipment and knowledge of actual costs. The country is thus
placed in a position to negotiate and monitor advantageous
agreements with the specialist contractors involved in oil
exploration and production. When the country attains this
stage, it grants neither concession nor production sharing
contracts and instead uses only service contracts and bears all
risks of exploration.
In the course of stage one through three, the country is
acquiring know-how and through specialist agency or bodies, it
monitors developments in the oil industry. The fourth stage is
entered into when the country on its own is able to undertake
exploration, production, refining and marketing. In spite of this,
however, the country remains heavily dependent on foreign
partnerships especially in the area of marketing and technology
until the fifth stage is reached.
The fifth and final stage presupposes availability within the
host country of sufficient technical and managerial know-how as
well as marketing experience. If financial resources permit, the
country could take over the oil industry completely and
practically carry out all operations without any compulsion to
rely on foreign expertise. Algeria may be regarded as having
approached this stage. 13 Whether a country in fact, takes this
step depends on factors which are beyond the scope of this
exercise but includes such things as the country's diplomatic
alignment which influences available contracts, nature of
available world energy supply, international political
conditions, etc.

The Nigerian Government oil Policy
Nigeria's oil policy since 1937 fits into the first three stages and
it is believed that the country is currently at the third stage. 14 In
the Nigerian experience, the first stage in the development of oil
policy started in earnest in 1937 and terminated with the
Petroleum Decree of 1969. The first part of this period until late
1950s was the period of wooing foreign oil companies and the
Nigerian oil scene was completely dominated by Anglo-Dutch
interests. The maximum incentives include, concessions,
generous depreciation allowances, etc. By 1958 when Nigeria
was fully entrenched as an important oil producer, the
companies were required to give up some of their areas of
concessions. The areas which they relinquished were made
available to other companies notably American, Italian and
French oil interests.
This period also marked the foundation of official bodies or
agency charged with the responsibility for petroleum affairs. 15
In the circumstances of Nigeria in the late 1950s, perhaps only a
few people could be found with any professional knowledge of
the oil industry. The then Chief Inspector of Mines who was
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pursued at two levels: the regulatory role of the oil industry was
played by the Ministry and the operational role by NNOC. This
resulted in unanticipated unhealthy rivalry. The Corporation
had a part-time Chairman and no general manager to supervise
its day to day affairs. The operations of the Corporation was
often hampered by excessive government interference. Since
NNOC was largely ineffective, it was replaced in 1977 by a new
agency which combined the functions of NNOC and the
Ministry of Petroleum Resources.
The new agency known as Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation (NNPC) is charged with the responsibility for oil
exploration, production, transportation, selling and refining of
petroleum products, marketing of petroleum products and
derivatives, and research. NNPC was thus envisaged as a fully
integrated oil company. Its role so far is impressive in relation to
the level of geophysical and drilling activities. For example,
kilometres of seismic lines shot increased from 255 in 1975 to
3,173 in 1979. In production, its efforts are still not significant
since the existing fields are yet to be developed and necessary
installations for production established. However, the
Corporation is involved in joint venture production with the
other oil companies although in sum, its role is still limited to
mere supervision and overseeing operations in the fields.
NNPC has been quite active in the distribution sector. It took
over effectively the distribution and transportation of petroleum
products hitherto controlled by private companies. It owns
National and African Petroleum and 60 per cent of Unipetrol.
To date, NNPC has constructed 23 depots and 3,000 km of
pipelines to facilitate oil distribution. In International crude
transportation, NNPC activity is so far unimpressive. Only one
ship has been procured and the ship is not being used to carry
Nigeria crudes but as a store.
The involvement of the NNPC in the refining sector is more
impressive. By the end of 1978, NNPC has bought over all the
shares in the Alesa-Eleme refinery. To increase the supplies of
petroleum products to match domestic demand and produce
excess for export, two new refineries at Warri and Kaduna were
constructed under the control of NNPC.
The involvement of NNPC in the other downstream activities
of petrochemicals, liquified natural gas, exports refineries, etc.,
has not been quite impressive and this may not be unconnected
with the lack of clear guidelines from the government.
NNPC pricing policy has been criticised variously for not
being sufficiently aggressive since the prices of Nigerian crudes
are slow in adjusting to demand trends in the international
market - witness the behaviour of the Nigerian prices in the
face of the current oil glut. The Corporation is also criticised in
the way 1t handles the marketing of its shares of crude oil which
results in over-dependence on foreign oil companies. Not only
has the NNPC failed to develop its own marketing networks, it is
also criticised for being inept in its supervisory role which allows
the oil companies to get away with obnoxious practices such as
oil spillages and pollution. NNPC direct participation with the
oil companies are also seen as mere window dressing since they
do not expose the Corporation to real decision making in the
partnerships. In the event, the country's majority share holding
functions no more than minority share. 17
While these criticisms are well meant, they appear to be
oblivious of the constraints under which NNPC operates. Some
of these relate to shortage of executive capacity; availability of
experienced Nigerians to handle the increasingly heavy
responsibilities of the oil industry. The country's membership of
OPEC imposes constraints on unilateral action on crude oil

pricing and production. The Corporation's freedom of action is
also highly circumscribed by government directives. Such
government intervention, for example, makes aggressive
pricing decisions difficult. One energy analyst maintains that
staff deployment like other major decisions are predicated upon
the prevailing political climate. 18

Section

m

NIGERIAN OIL PRICING POLICY
Nigeria joined OPEC in 1971. Before then the Petroleum
Profit Tax Ordinance of 1959 operative in the country was based
on 50/50 profit sharing with the oil companies - a Venezuelan
innovation in 1948 which was subsequently adopted by Saudi
Arabia and Iraq. Use of posted prices for calculating the oil
companies tax payments was also adopted by Nigeria in 1966.
Before 1966, the companies based taxes on realised prices which
had several disadvantages. Realised prices fluctuated widely
from company to company and from oil shipment to oil
shipment. There was no means of ascertaining at what price oil
was in reality sold. Producer governments could not therefore
effectively plan their budgets. The advantage of posted price
was that it sets a figure below which companies would not want
to sell their oil. Initially posted prices were fixed by the
companies alone. This changed in 1959 and more fundamentally
in 1973. When Nigeria joined OPEC in 1971 it was obliged to
implement OPEC resolutions on prices. Before then, Nigeria
relied on the most favoured nation principle whereby any better
terms given to another producer country automatically became
applicable to Nigeria. The need to join OPEC was necessitated
by the shame of being a "free rider" and the fact that Nigeria was
denied the back-ground information to published OPEC
decisions. On joining OPEC, Nigeria negotiated the Lagos
Agreement of 1971 based on the pattern of the Tehran and
Tripoli Agreements modified by the subsequent Geneva
Agreement. Under the agreements, monthly payments by the
oil companies replaced quarterly payments, the tax rate was
raised to 55 per cent and periodic increases in the posted price
was provided for while the capital allowances enjoyed by the
companies were realigned to realistic levels. Although the
provisions of these agreements between 1970 and 1972 resulted
in approximate doubling of oil export price, they were quickly
found to be inadequate in most respects. For instance, the
adjustment for inflation was fixed at 2.5 per cent per year. In
actual fact, inflation turned out to be many times that figure.
Posted prices lagged far behind market prices and it was clear
that new arrangements had to be made.
OPEC resolved to enter into new negotiations with the oil
companies, and in fact, the member countries of the Gulf had
commenced their negotiations. No progress was being made and
during a temporary break, the Yorn - Kippur war of October
1973 intervened. The subsequent events are well-known. The
affected member countries placed an embargo on their oil being
exported to certain unfriendly countries. There was thus an
increase in the demand for available oil and market prices rose
sharply. It was therefore inevitable that there should be a
corresponding adjustment in posted prices. Another new
element in the events was that government of exporting
countries fixed in their own right and for the first time and ever
since, the posted prices. Subsequent price increases since 1973
resulted in an average annual export price estimated at $10.50 a
barrel in 1974 - about seven times as high as in 1970. 19 In
bringing about this price escalation, OPEC maintained the same
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ratio between posted and marketing prices that existed before
the Tehran Agreement- indeed the same ratio was maintained
when new prices were again fixed in 1974.
In defending the price increases, OPEC maintained that in the
determination of crude oil prices, one should consider oil's
intrinsic value, the non-renewable nature of the resource and
the cost of developing and producing alternatives. On these
bases, it is further pointed out that the cost of oil had been
unduly low, encouraging a large and wasteful consumption of a
finite resource.
At the end of 1974, OPEC members introduced important
changes in the structure of oil prices and in the tax and royalty
rates. The new pricing system was based on the official selling
prices rather than posted price. The benchmark in the system
was the price of the marker crude (Arabian Light 34° API) which
had been changed from time to time by decisions of OPEC
members. Prices of particular crude oil have been determined by
the individual exporting countries taking acount of differences
in specific gravity and other crude oil characteristics as well as
geographical/ location i.e. proximity to consuming centres.
OPEC member countries then determine their posted prices on
the basis of a mathematical relationship to official selling price
using OPEC approved formula. 20
This then is the general framework of OPEC price
determination. Through collective decisions, the price of the
marker crude is fixed and other grades of crude accordingly take
their cue. Since the Nigerian crude variety with low sulphur
content is considered to be relatively superior to other grades
with high sulphur content, it attracts a higher price in the
international oil market. Together with Algerian and Libyan
crude, the Nigerian oil enjoys a range of price differential fixed
by OPEC. Within this range, individual country's prevailing
price is free to vary. Ruling OPEC prices vis-a-vis Nigerian
prices since 1972are shown in Table 3. In the decade 1972-1981,
average posted price for Nigerian oil increased continuously
from US $3.32 to US $42. 70 while export prices in the same
period rose from 3.23 to US $38.52.
In general, although prevailing prices of OPEC member
countries have moved in line with the marker crude, there have
been deviations associated with changes in demand for various
crude oils and other factors. For example, a split price structure
was in force during the first half of 1977 following a 5 per cent
price mark-up by Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia while the other
eleven members raised their prices by 10 per cent. Again during
1979 and 1980 oil prices rose sharply both in nominal and real
terms and the world oil market was characterised by unsettled
market conditions. The immediate events which triggered these
developments was the political revolution in Iran in early 1978
and early 1979 and the consequent interruptions of crude oil
supplied from that country which in 1976 through 1978 had
accounted for 20 per cent of the total crude oil output of oil
exporting countries (OEC). This event coincided with others
like the structural changes in world oil trade system involving a
substantial loss in secure long-term supplies by the major oil
refining and marketing companies. Consequently, security of
supply rather than price was the dominant factor for many
buyers of oil. In the face of the panic buying which resulted a
multi-tier price system emerged in OPEC pricing. It was not
until the extra-ordinary conference of OPEC held in Kuwait in
late October 1981 and the subsequent conference in Abu Dhabi
in early December 1981 that a unified OPEC price structure was
re-established at a base price of $34 per barrel for the Arabian
marker crude.
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Other factors - sometimes chance events have
implications for OPEC pricing. The oil price escalation in 1979
was very much influenced by the protracted war between Iran
and Iraq - a war which was not envisaged by the planners of
OPEC oil price strategy. These two events also coincided with
the recession in the economies of major oil importing countries
which was also not envisaged in the planning calculations of
OPEC strategies. But the combined effects of these
developments have precipitated unprecedented changes energy conservation, slower economic growth, fuel substitution
and stock draw-downs, etc - which currently characterise the
international oil market leading to falling spot market prices.
These developments have placed OPEC under great pressure to
maintain a substainable base price and have adversely affected
foreign exchange earnings.

Section IV
THE EFFECTS OF OIL ON SOME SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN NIGERIA
The oil industry as would be shown in the following analysis
has exerted a tremendous impact on the Nigerian economy.
However, from the point of view of inter-sectoral resource flow,
its link with the rest of the economy is largely negligible. This is
partly due to the fact that the industry is capital intensive and
requires sophisticated technology for efficient and competitive
performance. Owing to the lack of a symmetrical sophistication
in the other sectors of the economy, the country is not yet in a
position to capture what Hirschman (1958) has described as
backward and forward linkages. 21 The oil industry can thus be
regarded·as an 'enclave industry' since it has little or no ties with
the rest of the Nigerian economy. The activities of the NNPC
and its precursor notwithstanding, the know-how, machinery
and equipment and most of the managerial personnel in use in
the industry are imported wholesale. The enclave nature of the
industry is such that Iwayemi (1981) opined:
An industry that was the most important in the economy
could only employ 29,000 workers, less than 10 per cent of
employed labour in the manufacturing sector and less than 0.1
per cent of the total labour force. If government related
payments are excluded, local payments (by the industry) is
less than 0.05 per cent of the total local expenditure. 22

In spite of its low· linkage, the oil industry since 1970 has
become the most dominant factor in the revenue of Nigerian
governments. In absolute terms, government revenue from oil
has grown significantly from~ 166.4 million or 26.3 per cent of
total revenue in 1970 to ~3,726.7 million or 82.1 per cent of
total Federal Government revenue in 1974. Although the
proportion has since declined from this peak and fluctuated
between 62.4 (1981) and 81.4 (1979) in the period 1975 to 1981,
the oil industry remains pre-eminent as a source of government
revenue (see Table 4).
The federally-collected revenue of the government is
allocated according to an agreed formula among the three tiers
of government, namely local, state and federal. Following
Okigbo Commission's Recommendation on Revenue
Allocation (1979) and the subsequent Act passed by the
National Assembly, the current formula is as follows: Federal
Government 55 per cent, states 35 per cent and local
government 10 per cent. The allocations are spent by the
Federal and State governments on their capital and recurrent
budgets. The capital budgets may be viewed as the annual
implementation of the development projects included in
National Development plans, dating from the First National

Development Plan, 1962-68 to the current Fourth Development projected capital investment under the first three development
Plan, 1981-85.
plans, actual expenditure by the public sector is estimated at 68
The First Development Plan (1962-68) provided for a capital per cent. Of this, about 60 per cent was devoted to
expenditure of M2,366 million. Of this total, 50 per cent was infrastructural development. Since investment in infrastructure
projected to come from abroad. The Plan later faced difficulties is not productive investment, there has been a tendency for
as only 25 per cent of the expected foreign loans materialised. productivity to rise less than might be. It is important to note
Out of the M3.2 billion capital expenditure of the Second that when it is stated that investment in infrastructure is not
Development Plan (1970-74) only 19 per cent was expected to 'productive' in the sense that such investment can be looked
come from external sources. The Third Development Plan upon as capital widening, it must not be inferred that such
(1975-80) was estimated to cost M53.0 billion about sixteen investment is not useful or needed. Development of
times the size of the Second Plan. It was estimated that this infrastructure can facilitate rising productivity of factors.
colossal amount would be obtained locally as a result of
Per capita income in the country has grown significantly.
projected oil revenues. A resort to the Euro-dollar market to Thanks to the oil industry. Nigeria's per capita income is
raise M2 billion in 1978 was necessitated by the oil glut in the currently estimated at $800 having risen from $400 in 1976 or
international market reflecting world economic recession. In the $140 in 1971. 26
Fourth Plan period (1981-85) capital expenditure was projected
In spite of this, there is a strong indication that the oil wealth
at M 82 billion. The oil industry was expected to generate the has made income distribution more skewed. Trade union
bulk of the financial resources needed, with external borrowing activities, minimum wage legislation as well as social
contributing only a projected M6 billion. 23
conventions have helped to raise the remuneration of employees
The spending of colossal sums of oil revenue to prosecute the in the modem sector while the majority of the population
various development plans as reflected in governments' remain under-employed in peasant agriculture or are eking out a
budgetary outlay on capital and recurrent account, has resulted subsistence life in the urban informal sector. Similarly unequal
in rapid monetary expansion that is not matched by domestic distribution of social amenities in favour of the urban areas is
productivity. Consequently the economy has been subjected to postulated to have exacerbated the problem of rural/urban
over-heating and high inflationary pressures. If local supplies migration.
are inadequate, essential commodities especially inputs of goods
The oil industry has imparted to the economy greater selfand services could be imported. In this sense, the external sector reliance. The indigenisation programme and the gradual taking
can provide a measure of the country's productive effort. In the over by government of the 'commanding heights' of the Nigerian
Nigerian case, import of needed inputs faces serious economy is a case in point.
competition for scarce foreign exchange resources from the
imports of all sorts of consumer goods into the country. Where
official regulations prohibit the importation of certain items, CONCLUSION
these are smuggled in and sold openly to the detriment of local
From the analysis produced in this paper the following
manufacturing industries which are thus confronted with unfair conclusions may be drawn:
competition. Given this high propensity to consume foreign
1. The economic and financial objectives of the oil companies
goods and services, the country is faced with a high import bill.
cannot be assumed to be identical to those of the Federal
For example, while total earnings of the country fluctuated
Government; in fact they are more often than not in
between M9.551 billion and M 11.554 billion in 1979 and 1981
conflict. While the companies pursue rational global profit
respectively imports rose steadily from M7.473 billion to
maximisation in a ruthless manner, the Nigerian
M 12.013 billion in the same period. 24 Following these
Government seeks to obtain maximum benefits from
operations of the companies located in its territory. The
developments, total foreign exchange disbursements in 1981 up
to April 1982 was running at a monthly average of M 1.2 billion
situation is complicated; it calls for complex negotiations
as against total earnings of about M800 million monthly. As a
and sometimes diplomatic arm-twisting and takes into
result, the country's foreign exchange reserves are under severe
consideration a host of factors which are both economic
pressures as they are whittled down to main unsustainable level
and political.
2. The Federal Government has availed itself of the
of imports. Thus at the end of 1981, the country's balance of
payments was plunged into a deficit of about M3.0 billion. 25
advantages offered by OPEC which it joined in 1971.
3. It is clear from the analysis that the short-term objective of
For the rest of this section, some tentative observations about
government is to extract from the oil industry maximum
the mixed effects of Nigeria's oil wealth on the country's sociobenefits. This objective is inspired by a desire to accelerate
economic environment are highlighted. The oil industry as can
the pace of Nigeria's economic development and to raise
readily be inferred has provided ample financial resources for
quickly the standards or quality of living of the people of
the prosecution of the various development programmes
Nigeria. Similarly, the long-term objective are designed to
especially since the war. Notable examples of achievement
promote economic self-reliance through diversification of
under the various plans include the expansion of infrastructural
the economy which would then facilitate the growth of
developments, i.e. roads, bridges, construction including the
employment, increase in the supply of high-level
monumental Nigeria's Arts Theatre and Stadia complexes
manpower and a more equitable income distribution. Only
located in urban areas. Without the revenue from crude
then would government truely realise its avowed policy to
petroleum, it would have been utterly impossible to
control the 'commanding heights' of the Nigerian
contemplate the iron and steel complex (sections of which have
economy.
become operative since 1981) the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)
4. The oil price escalation which characterised the
project and the Petrochemical industry, etc. However, escalated
international oil market since 1973n4 has brought about
government expenditures following implementation of the plans
certain policies - conservation, fuel substitution, dehas resulted in excessive monetary expansion which has given
stockpiling, etc., - in the major oil consuming countries.
rise to inflationary problems. Indeed as a proportion of
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In more recent times since 1979 such policies have
coincided with protracted economic recession in the

industrialised nations and have exacerbated the current oil
glut. The glut together with the politics of oil poses a
serious threat to the solidarity of OPEC while putting
Nigeria, the weakest link in the OPEC chain, in a foreign
exchange strait jacket.
5. The cumulative impact of the achievements under the
various development plans have been seen to have resulted
in a lop-sided economic development which has intensified
urban/rural divergence and migration from the rural into
urban areas.
6. Greater skewness of income distribution is also believed to
have resulted from the concentration of oil wealth in the
hands of the more powerful but small group of economic
interests.
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TABLE 1
CRUDE on, STATISTICS

Period
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

1969
1970·
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981

Production
(Barrels 000)
(1)
1,876
4,096
6,367
16,802
24,624
27,913
43,997
99,354
152,428
116,553
51,907
197,204

395,836
558,679
643,207
750,593
823,318
651,507
758,058
766,054
661,(H)
842,474
752,498
522,102

Average Daily
Production
(Barrels 000)
(2)

5
11
17
46
68
76
120
270
418
319
142
540
1,084 1,531
1,757
2,056
2,256
1,785
2,071
2,099
1,829
2,308
2,056
1,430

Source: Compiled from Central Bank files and returns

from Lagos Chambers of Commerce.
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EXPORTS

Barrels
(000)
(3)
1,820
3,957
6,244
16,505
24,680
27,701
43,432
96,985
139,550
109,275
52,130
197,246 -383,455
542,545
650,980
723,314
795,710
627,839
736,823
744,413
667,387
812,727
701,260
458,162

Value
(N' million)
(4)
1.8
5.2
8.4
22.6
34.4
40.4
64.0
136.2
184.0
142.0
77.6

301 2\-------"
509.6l
1,053.~
1,176.
1,893.5 ____
5,365,1'
4,565.1
6,321.7
7,072.8
5,401.6
10,166.8
13,523.0
10,280.3

__,,

r,

TABLE2

NIGERIA'S CRUDE On, EXPORTS: 1958-1911
(N million)

Traditional export
Commodities

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

263.6

315.6

322.4

317.2

294.6

329.3

356.6

390.4

372.4

324.2

332.3

367.2

367.8

340.4

172.0

230.9

276.0

230.6

274.1

375.7

412.8

468.0

340.1

13.2

19.7

2.2

-1.6

-1.7

11.7

8.2

9.5

-4.4 -10.5

-0.4

10.3

0.2

-7.5 -49.4

45.4

10.4 -16.5

18.9

37.1

9.9

13.4

-27.3

-66.7

5.2

8.4

22.6

34.4

40.4

64.0

136.2

188.9

61.5

161.4

45.2

21.0

58.9

112.2

321.0

330.8

339.8

329.0

369.6

420.6

526.6

20.9

3.1

2.7

-3.6

12.7

13.9

25.2

1.6

2.5

6.7

10.5

10.9

15.2

25.9

Growth Rate %

Crude Oil Exports

1.8

Growth Rate %

Total Export

265.4

Growth Rate %

Proportion of Crude oil
in total export

0.7

Sources: (1) 1958-1968 L.H. Shatz!, Petroleum in Nigeria, Ibadan, 1969, p. 153
(2) 1968-71 Federal Office of Statistics
(3) Central Bank of Nigeria.

184.0

142.4

n.6 301.6 501J.6 1053.0 1176.2 1893.5 5365.7 4565.1 6321.7 7072.8 5401.6 10166.8 13523.0 10280.3

35.1 -22.8 -45.4 237.6
556.4

11.9

-23.6

877.4 1393.4 1348.2 2143.6 5641.7 4793.7 6595.8 7448.5

5814.4

94.5

87.0

0.1

61.0

410.4

668.8

5.7 -16.2 -12.0

63.0

31.2

58.8

-3.2

59.0

45.1

58.1

75.6

87.2

88.3

33.1

466.2

30.6

1981

18.9

183.4 -15.0

163.2 -15.0
95.1

95.2

38.5

88.2

33.0

-24.0

10634.8 13863.1 10470.1

37.6

12.9

-21.9

82.9

30.4

-25.0

95.8

95.0

92.9

95.6

97.6

98.2

..•

TABLE3
NIGERIAN CRUDE-OIL PRIC~: 1972-81

(US $/bbl)
Period

1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981

Average

Average
Posted
Prices

Average
Export
Prices

Bonny Light

(37° API)
Prices

Average
Saudi Arabia
Light
(34° API)
Prices

3.316
4.649
14.661
12.944
13.775
15.231
14.816
21.560
39.233
42.695

3.233
4.135
12.623
11.855
13.131
14.744
13.981
20.722
35.183
38.518

3.221
4.111
12.038
11.866
13.590
15.216
14.155
20.952
35.406
38.750

2.479
5.036
11.251
12.376
12.376
13.000
14.000
16.288
29.000
34.000

Sources: (1) Petroleum Intelligence Weekly.
(2) N.N.P.C.'s Monthly Petroleum Information.
(3) Petroleum Economist OPEC Report, p. 49.

TABLE4
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE FROM CRUDE PETROLEUM
1970-1981

(H million)
Year

Oil
Revenue

Total
Current
Revenue

Oil Revenue as
Percentage of
Total

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981

166.4
510.2
764.3
1,016.0
3,726.7
4,271.5
5,365.2
6,080.6
4,654.1
8,880.9
10,990.2
9,193.6

633.2
1,169.0
1,404.8
1,695.3
4,537.0
5,514.7
6,765.9
8,080.6
7,371.1
10,913.1
15,813.1 •
14,745.7*

26.3
43.6
54.4
59.9
82.1
77.5
79.3
75.2/
63.1
81.4
69.5
62.4

• Budget Estimates:

Source: Federal Ministry of Finance; Lagos; C.B.N. Economic and Financial Review.
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